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By STEVEN P. LANzA
Most  economists  believe  that  the 
nation  is  beginning  to  bounce  back 
from  the  deepest  slump  since  the 
Great Depression.  But if recessions 
past are any guide, the recovery pro-
cess  will  likely  be  both  bumpy  and 
protracted, because growth tends to 
return  unevenly  across  the  regional 
landscape.    Some  states  rebound 
quickly, while others find the road to 
recovery a long, hard slog.  What fac-
tors explain the speed at which states 
are able to shake off a recession? And 
what lessons for today might recover-
ies past carry for Connecticut? 
	 Even	 modest	 downturns	 can	
be	 economically	 debilitating,	 and	
this	 slump	 has	 hardly	 been	 modest.	 	
Economies	are	usually	able	to	rescale	








one	 harder-hit,	 things	 could	 get	 far	
hairier.
RECESSION-BY-ThE-NUMBERS




and	 spent	 about	 50	 months	 below	




and	 Wyoming	 passed	 through	 the	
recession	unscathed:	no	jobs	were	lost,	




the	 state	 is	 currently	 suffering	 some	





(3.6%	 of	 peak	 jobs),	 and	 faced	 lean	
times	for	longer	than	did	the	nation	
as	a	whole	(85	vs.	50	months).		The	
































ment.	 	 Another	 is	 the	 proportion	 of	
lost	jobs	recovered	within	a	particular	
period	 of	 time,	 such	 as	 the	 average	
length	 of	 recovery	 across	 all	 states.	 	

















	 Unfortunately,	 that	 simple	 idea	
sheds	 little	 light	 on	 the	 mechanics	























































































































































SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy, based on U.S. Labor Dept. data.
Bouncing Back
Explaining the Ability to Recover from Recession in                       
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*23 months marks the average 
time it took states to recover 
the jobs lost in the 2001 
Recession.
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influences	 may	 even	 work	 in	 oppo-










biggest	 influence	 on	 economic	 resil-
ience,	I	used	the	2001	recession	as	an	
experimental	 lab	 of	 sorts,	 gathering	
data	on	each	state’s	recovery	from	that	
downturn	 and	 on	 state	 characteris-
tics	 that	 could	 plausibly	 explain	 the	
rebounds.	The	table	on	page	16	lists	

































a	 secondary	 regression	 (not	 shown),	
I	 netted	 out	 those	 characteristics	 to	
produce	 an	 adjusted	 variable,	 adjbtu,	









research	 group,	 The	 Fraser	 Institute:	
government	size	as	a	percent	of	GDP	
(govsize),	tax	rates	(taxes),	and	market	
“freedom”	 or	 regulation,	 (reg)	 in	 the	
form	 of	 minimum	 wage	 laws,	 union	
density,	and	more.
	 To	 account	 for	 potential	 social	
influences	 on	 economic	 resilience,	 I	
constructed	 Herfindahl	 indexes	 for	
both	race	(racehi)	and	religion	(relighi).	 	
Herfindahl	indexes	vary	from	0	to	1,	























READING ThE TEA LEAVES







	 	 Regression	 1,	 incorporating	 all	
of	 the	 variables	 discussed	 above,	
































SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy,based on U.S. Labor Dept. data.
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in	the	dependent	variable.		But	it	also	
found	that	most	of	the	variables—all	
those	 intended	 to	 capture	 technol-
ogy,	 government	 size,	 worker	 health,	
inequality,	and	race,	plus	most	industry	
LQs	(omitted	from	the	results	shown	
to	 save	 space)—were	 not	 statistically	
significant	at	the	5%	level	or	below.
	 Thus,	in	Regression	2,	I	narrowed	























intuitive:	 having	 one’s	 eggs	 in	 fewer	
industry	 baskets	 makes	 a	 state	 more	
vulnerable	 to	 a	 major	 hit	 during	 a	
recession.	 	 Offsetting	 that	 weakness,	
however,	is	that	more	specialized	states	
may	 possess	 more	 solid	 capabilities	
(e.g.,	 aptitudes	 and	 experiences)	 that	














clq)	 enjoyed	 more	 robust	 recoveries,	
thanks	no	doubt	to	their	ability	to	cap-
italize	 on	 the	 decade’s	 housing	 craze.	 	
High	construction	LQs	may	also	have	
indicated	 a	 larger	 quantity	 of	 non-
residential	 fixed	 capital	 (commercial	
property,	 public	 infrastructure,	 etc.)	
available	during	the	recovery	period.	
	 	 Regression	 2	 also	 showed	 that,	
as	 expected,	 greater	 energy	 efficiency	
(adjbtu)	is	associated	with	greater	resil-
ience.	 	 And	 one	 social	 indicator,	 the	
Herfindahl	 index	 of	 religious	 affilia-
tion	(relighi),	is	significant.		Religious	
homogeneity	 may	 serve	 as	 a	 kind	 of	




tax	 rates	 (taxes)	 and	 regulation	 (reg),	
became	statistically	insignificant	once	








substituting	 a	 variable	 for	 the	 share	
of	 the	 state	 economy	 tied	 to	 exports	
DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC RESILIENCE
SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy.






Regression 1  Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Coefficient   p-value  Coefficient   Coefficient  Coefficient 
c   0.6121  0.9536 -4.2464  0.0332 -5.9643   0.0247 -20.4406   0.3463  
expct   -2.3760  0.4416    -2.8295   0.1558  
somecoll   -0.0067  0.8869    0.0234   0.1202  
mort   -0.0051  0.1969   
pat   -0.0005  0.5716     
adjbtu   -0.0032  0.0170  -0.0032  0.0040  -0.0026   0.0138   0.0444   0.0007  
temp   -0.0023  0.9809    -0.6276   0.0001  
govsize   -0.2252  0.1955    4.3010   0.0208  
taxes   0.4692  0.0206    -7.0368   0.0026  
reg   -0.4613  0.0750    4.1466   0.0560  
racehi   -1.8020  0.4780   
relighi   3.3290  0.0048  3.4283  0.0204  2.7439   0.0246  
famgini   7.8472  0.3519    143.2380   0.0071  
indhi   43.3145  0.0047  40.5241  0.0057  38.4521   0.0156  
clq   2.0623  0.0232  1.2069  0.0153  1.6566   0.0021   -8.7101   0.0370  
mlq   -0.1374  0.7710  -0.7598  0.0528   























Connecticut is slow 
to recover from reces-
sions should come as no 
surprise.  Every model 
tested predicts a sluggish 
rebound.WINTER 2010  THE CONNECTICUT ECONOMY  17 
produced	a	marginally	significant	coef-
ficient	on	expct,	hinting	that	the	export	
interpretation	 of	 the	 manufacturing	
variable	may	hold	water.		This	speci-
fication	also	yielded	a	marginally	sig-
nificant	 coefficient	 on	 the	 education	




	 In	 Regression	 4,	 the	 dependent	
variable—the	definition	of	resilience—
is	the	time	it	took	to	regain	the	pre-
vious	 peak	 level	 of	 jobs	 instead	 of	
the	 percentage	 of	 jobs	 recovered	 in	
a	 fixed	 time	 period.	 	 The	 switch	 of	
course	 reverses	 the	 coefficient	 signs,	
but	also	preserves	the	significance,	of	
several	 variables:	 percentage	 of	 jobs	
lost	(lostpct),	energy	efficiency	(adjbtu),	
and	the	construction	location	quotient	
(clq).	 	 But	 there	 are	 notable	 differ-
ences.		Industry	concentration	(indhi)	
is	 no	 longer	 significant,	 and	 inter-
family	 income	 inequality	 (famgini)	
replaces	the	concentration	of	religious	
beliefs	(relighi)	as	the	significant	social	
variable;	 greater	 income	 inequality	 is	
associated	with	longer	recovery	times.	 	
Also,	the	climate	variable	temp	tested	
statistically	 significant,	 with	 warmer	
states	 recovering	 more	 quickly	 than	
their	colder	neighbors.
			Most	interesting	in	Regression	4,	
the	 three	 public	 policy	 variables	 that	
were	 not	 significant	 in	 Regressions	
1-3—government	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	
GDP	 (govsize),	 tax	 rates	 (taxes),	 and	
regulation	(reg)—became	strongly	sig-




the	 indexes	 for	 govsize,	 taxes	 and	 reg	
imply	 a	 smaller	 footprint	 for	 state-
and-local	 government.	 	 	 The	 results	
in	 Regression	 4	 suggest	 that,	 while	
lower	taxes	are	associated	with	speedier	
recoveries,	so	too	are	larger	public	sec-








	 Business	 leaders,	 policymakers	
and	 job	 seekers	 alike	 complain	 that	
Connecticut	 is	 slow	 to	 recover	 from	


















(Recall	 that	 two	 states—Alaska	 and	























ride	 the	 monster	 homebuilding	 wave	
that	followed	the	last	recession.		(That	
fact	may	now	offer	some	consolation	
during	 the	 current,	 housing-induced	
economic	collapse.)		
	 By	 the	 second	 measure	 of	 resil-













relatively	 small	 government	 (govsize)	
financed	with	high	tax	rates	(taxes);	by	




deter	 businesses	 and	 skilled	 workers	
alike	who	prefer	warmer	climes.	
	 What	 role	 might	 such	 variables	






battered	 housing	 industry	 and	 cheap	
dollar,	reverse	roles	during	the	coming	
upturn,	or	have	little	effect	at	all.		But	








quickly	 from	 recessionary	 job	 losses?	 	
Perhaps	not,	but	the	factors	that	seem	
to	be	important	in	explaining	resilience	
are	 slow	 to	 change	 and	 amenable	 to	
limited	influence	by	public	policymak-
ers.		Don’t	expect	miracles,	then,	in	the	
state’s	recovery	from	the	current	400-
pound	gorilla	of	a	recession.		